For many philosophers, the existence of evil poses a serious problem for theistic belief. What’s the problem exactly? Well, if God really does exist as an all-knowing, all-powerful, wholly-benevolent being, then how can the theist explain the existence of pain and suffering in the world? As the ancient riddle goes: Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Is he able, but not willing? If he is both able and willing, whence then evil. And if he is neither able nor willing, why call Him God at all? Although the riddle paints a pretty good picture of the dilemma, there are many questions that need to be worked through. For instance, what is ‘evil’ anyway? Does it really exist? Are there different kinds of evil? If so, how do these differences affect the so- called problem? Is the problem of evil primarily a logical one? Is the existence of pain and suffering logically incompatible with the existence of God? Or is there some way to rationally reconcile the existence of evil with the existence of God? Even if there is some way to resolve the apparent inconsistency, doesn’t the existence of evil at least make the existence of God improbable? Given the tremendous amount of senseless pain and suffering evident in the world, isn’t it highly unlikely that a benevolent God exists?